The Three Internal Barriers to Deep-Tech Corporate Venturing

Learned a lot lending an editorial hand here:

MIT Sloan Management Review, January 10, 2022

by Josemaria Siota and Maria Julia Prats

The flow of capital to deep-tech startups is rapidly becoming a torrent. From 2016 to 2020, annual investments in startups focused on commercializing emerging technologies such as biotechnology, robotics, and quantum computing grew in value from $15 billion to $60 billion worldwide, with the average private investment more than tripling in size. Deep-tech corporate venturing (CV) — the second-largest source of this funding — grew from $5.1 billion in 2016 to $18.3 billion in 2020.

The intent behind these deep-tech corporate investments is clear. In theory, deep-tech CV enables companies to quickly gain expertise in leading-edge technologies and pursue potentially disruptive innovations without building internal capabilities from scratch. In reality, however, such funding can come with high hurdles, such as time-to-market durations that often exceed five years, and the greater risk inherent to novel and complex technologies. The difficulties are underscored by an analysis we conducted using CV data from 46 international companies that was collected under the auspices of IESE Business School in 2018. It revealed that 68.9% of the initiatives failed to deliver their expected results.

To better understand the most significant barriers to success in deep-tech CV and the tactics that chief innovation officers (CINOs) can use to achieve more positive results, we turned to East and Southeast Asia for our new study. (In 2019, Asian companies accounted for 40% of corporate venture investments in startups, the largest percentage globally.) The study included an analysis of CV in 180 companies and interviews with 77 of their innovation executives, most of whom work in companies with CV portfolios that include a 25% or greater concentration of deep-tech startups. It revealed three internal barriers that CINOs commonly encounter with deep-tech startups and the ways in which they can be overcome. Read the rest here.

Break Out to Open Innovation

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MIT Sloan Management Review, December 7, 2021

by Denis Bettenmann, Ferran Giones, Alexander Brem, and Philipp Gneiting


Image courtesy of Daniel Garcia/theispot.com

Mercedes-Benz AG produces over 2 million passenger cars annually for a global market in the throes of transformation. Automakers are meeting new demands for electrification and connectivity, new competitors are arising, and customers have new expectations, such as the desire for sustainable mobility. All of these trends are driving the need to speed innovation in every facet of the automotive industry.

In 2016, R&D and digital business managers at Mercedes’s headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, realized that their efforts to collaborate with startups — a valuable source of external innovation — were being hampered by the company’s existing innovation processes. Those processes were overly focused on internal development and ready-to-implement solutions provided by the company’s established base of suppliers and weren’t well suited to uncertainty-ridden collaborations with promising technology startups. The company needed an innovation pathway capable of more effectively integrating startups earlier in the R&D process and significantly reducing the time required to identify, develop, test, and implement their most promising technologies and solutions.

In response, a new team within R&D was formed to build a better bridge between the promising ideas of external startups and the innovation needs of Mercedes’s internal business units. The team joined forces with partners from academia and industry to cofound Startup Autobahn, what we call an open corporate accelerator (CA). Unlike a conventional corporate accelerator — typically established by a single company for its own benefit — an open CA welcomes multiple sponsor companies and can attract a broader array of more mature startups. This model, also known as a consortium accelerator, improves sponsor access to external innovation and enhances the overall competitiveness of regional ecosystems...read the rest here

The Overlooked Partners That Can Build Your Talent Pipeline

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MIT Sloan Management Review, March 29, 2021

by Nichola J. Lowe

Image courtesy of Stephanie Dalton Cowan/theispot.com

America has a skill problem. It’s not the result of inadequate educational systems letting down younger workers or a lack of aptitude among older workers, as some claim. The problem is the widespread failure of American companies to share responsibility for skill development. Many employers are simply unwilling — or unable — to invest sufficient resources, time, and energy into work-based learning and the creation of skill-rewarding career pathways that extend economic opportunity to workers on the lowest rungs of the labor market ladder.

This national skills crisis becomes clearest whenever unemployment rates are low. As late as February 2020, most industries in the U.S. showed persistent signs of skills shortages. In manufacturing, for instance, there were 522,000 unfilled job openings in late 2019. There were similar long-standing job vacancies in many other critical industries, including financial and business services, health care, and telecommunications, with executives noting increased skills gaps in data analytics, information technology, and web design, among other areas.

The skills shortage was less obvious during the COVID-19 pandemic, as companies shed millions of jobs, but it persists despite that temporary softening of the labor market. And as hiring picks up along with the economy, employers may increasingly develop workforce strategies that are based not only on skills requirements but on increased commitments to boosting diversity and inclusion.

A better and more enduring skills strategy must begin with the recognition that our national skills crisis rests on a deeply rooted but flawed assumption: namely, that skills are individually held. This view overlooks the collective and context-specific nature of skills — that is, the ways in which they are shared, reinforced, and reproduced through group interactions at work. It also creates a false justification for the bias and hoarding that often accompany employers’ approaches to talent management. That results in more educated workers benefiting from corporate investments in retention, leaving those workers with less formal education underserved and undervalued — a phenomenon that labor scholars call the “great training paradox.” Moreover, it leads to the mistaken categorization of entry-level workers as “unskilled.” This positions them as irrelevant and easy to replace, ignoring the fact that this segment of the workforce — so often women and people of color —not only executes strategy but also has the grounded insights needed to improve organizational processes and practices.

The core assumption that skill is individually held results in supply-side approaches that place the primary burden for skill development on educational institutions and on students within them. These approaches have not and cannot, in isolation, do the trick. Skill shortages are a problem of employment, not education...read the rest here

Four Questions for Appraising Your Alliances

MIT Sloan Management Review, December 22, 2020

by Theodore Kinni



Over the past four years, many of the United States’ geopolitical alliances have been remade with bewildering speed. It’s no surprise that many of those changes created an uproar — some of these relationships dated back a century or more and seemed sacrosanct, until they weren’t. It also prompted Stephen Walt, the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations at Harvard University, to cut through the noise with an article in Foreign Policy titled “How to Tell if You’re in a Good Alliance,” which is instructive for business leaders as well as diplomats.

Walt is a pragmatist, so the first thing he points out is the unspoken assumption behind the uproar: that each of a nation’s existing political alliances is actually worth maintaining. “Surely this is not the case, for all allies are not created equal, and the value of any commitment is likely to wax and wane over time,” he writes. “Wise countries choose their allies carefully and do not treat any of them as sacred and inviolable.”

This is as true in business as it is in international relations. Corporate alliances are a means to an end, and they involve costs and obligations. Accordingly, corporate leaders, like the heads of nations, should never take the value of their partnerships for granted. Toward that end, you can conduct a fast review of the value of your company’s alliances by asking the following four questions, derived from the short list of attributes of a good ally that Walt offers in his article.

Does your partner make a meaningful contribution to the alliance? This is a key question when reviewing a partnership. It’s also one that torpedoed the 2009 alliance between Suzuki Motor Corp. and Volkswagen. Volkswagen wanted to gain greater access to the fast-growing Indian market through Suzuki, and Suzuki wanted access to Volkswagen’s hybrid and diesel technologies. The problem, claimed Suzuki chairman Osamu Suzuki less than two years after the companies bought stakes in each other, was that the technology Suzuki sought wasn’t forthcoming. Suzuki didn’t need the technology that VW was willing to provide, and VW wouldn’t provide access to the technology that it did need. If your partner hasn’t made the contributions it promised, you don’t have a good ally. Read the rest here.

Driving Growth in Digital Ecosystems

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MIT Sloan Management Review, August 18, 2020

by Ina M. Sebastian, Peter Weill, and Stephanie L. Woerner

Image Courtesy of Harry Campbell/theispot.com

High-growth companies don’t go it alone. Increasingly, they are achieving results by creating and orchestrating digitally connected ecosystems — coordinated networks of enterprises, devices, and customers — that create value for all of their participants.

Companies whose dominant business model is ecosystem driver — in both B2B and B2C domains, such as energy management, home ownership, and financial services — experienced revenue growth approximately 27 percentage points higher than the average for their industries, and had profit margins 20 percentage points above the average for their industries, according to our research. That 2019 global survey of 1,311 executives also found that successful drivers achieve outsized results by attracting the partners needed to provide complementary — and competing — products and services that make their ecosystems seamless “one-stop shopping” destinations for customers.

Complementary offerings make it easier for customers to obtain comprehensive solutions to their problems. For example, when China’s largest insurer, Ping An, realized that its customers wanted not only insurance but also a means of addressing their medical and well-being needs, it created Good Doctor. The Good Doctor platform offers 24-7 one-stop health care services that are provided by pharmacies, hospitals, and about 10,000 doctors. In September 2019, Good Doctor reported serving more than 62 million customers monthly. Moreover, nearly 37% of Ping An customers used more than one of its services in 2019 — an important measure of ecosystem success.

As all of this suggests, a strong partnering capability is required to successfully grow digital ecosystems. This capability must be designed to support digital partnering, which is not the same as the traditional handshake and bespoke partnering of the physical world. Traditional partnering often includes exclusive relationships, long-term contracts, and deep integrations, all of which take time to establish and require strategic commitment. Digital partnering creates growth by adding more products and customers via digital connections with other companies that enable fast response to customer needs. It requires the ability to determine and agree with partners about who will create value, how revenue will be apportioned, and what data will be shared; it also requires the capacity to quickly add partners’ products and services via plug-and-play connections that offer immediate order and payment processing, and sometimes delivery as well.Successful ecosystem drivers also offer their customers greater choice, even when that entails featuring competing offers. In Australia, real estate platform driver Domain partners with about 35 mortgage lenders to offer homebuyers more loan choices. In the second half of 2019, the company’s Consumer Solutions segment, which consists of its loans, insurance, and utilities connections businesses, grew revenue by 72%...read the rest here