Showing posts with label politics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label politics. Show all posts

Thursday, October 15, 2020

What Elite Donors Want

Insights by Stanford Business, October 14, 2020

by Theodore Kinni

REUTERS/Joshua Roberts

In November 2012, newly elected Democratic members of the United States Congress got about a week to savor their victories. Then, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee advised them to start hitting the phones for 3-4 hours per day. Who were they supposed to be calling? Mainly, elite donors — the fewer than 1% of Americans who give candidates more than $200 in any given election cycle.

It isn’t news that politicians court elite donors or that elite donors have greater political access and influence than the typical voter. But, as Stanford Graduate School of Business political economist Neil Malhotra points out in an article recently published in Public Opinion Quarterly, “we know remarkably little about what they actually want from government.”

This is a particularly relevant issue during the current, seemingly endless, election cycle, in which the battle for control of the executive and legislative branches of the federal government is unusually contentious and fraught with implications for the future of the nation.

Malhotra and his coauthor David Broockman, a former Stanford GSB professor who recently moved to the University of California, Berkeley, based their findings on a survey they conducted of 1,152 elite donors, who collectively contributed more than $17.2 million to election campaigns since 2008. That survey was performed for an earlier study aimed at understanding the political anatomy of tech entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley, whom they labeled “liberaltarians.” Read the rest here.

Wednesday, August 19, 2020

What if every job seeker got a living-wage job?

strategy+business, August 19, 2020

by Theodore Kinni



Photograph by Katja Kircher

It’s usually eye-opening when the economic assumptions that underlie a society are questioned. In The Case for a Job Guarantee, by Pavlina R. Tcherneva, an associate professor of economics at Bard College and a research scholar at the Levy Economics Institute, that assumption is embedded in the concept known as the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU).

NAIRU assumes that when the unemployment rate gets too low, it will force companies to raise wages and then prices, causing inflation. This leads economists to try to suss out the optimal rate of unemployment, and the Federal Reserve to try to slow investment and hiring whenever the ranks of the unemployed grow too thin — cold comfort when you are in those ranks.

“The idea that involuntary unemployment is an unfortunate but unavoidable occurrence, and that there is an appropriate level of unemployment necessary for the smooth functioning of the economy, is among the great, unexamined myths of our time,” declares Tcherneva in this concise polemic. “It is also bad economics.”

The actual nature of the relationship between unemployment and inflation is an unsolved mystery, according to Tcherneva. Moreover, the Fed has no “reliable” theory of inflation — even though the Fed began to claim, starting in 2014, that the U.S. economy was at full employment. (Never mind the 3 to 4 million people who were unemployed and seeking work.)

The assumption that there is an optimal level of unemployment comes with harsh ramifications. Unemployed people are less healthy and suffer higher rates of suicide and mortality. Their lifetime earnings shrink, and they often must be supported by social welfare programs as they try to find to work. Chronic unemployment causes communities to decline and collapse. In macroeconomic terms, unemployment depresses GDP growth — Tcherneva cites an analysis by Australian economist Bill Mitchell, who calculated a decline of nearly US$10 billion in output per day caused by unemployment during the Great Recession in the U.S. (versus output if the “full” employment rate at 2.8 percent per annum average GDP growth of 2003–07 had held).

“What if we changed all that,” asks Tcherneva, “and made it a social and economic objective that no job seeker would be left without (at a minimum) decent living-wage work?” The solution she strongly advocates is a job guarantee: a commitment by the government to provide everyone who wants to work with a job. If a job is not available in the private sector, it will be provided in the public sector...read the rest here

Saturday, March 11, 2017

Regulation, Who Needs It?

LinkedIn, March 11, 2017
by Theodore Kinni

President Trump wasted no time launching his promised war on federal regulation. Ten days after the inauguration, he signed Executive Order 13771: Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs.

You’ve probably already heard that EO 13771 is a two-for-one deal. It requires that every newly proposed federal regulation be accompanied by the repeal of two existing regulations. And just in case the folks at the FDA or EPA or SEC or any other agency think they can pull a fast one, the order also requires that the total additional cost of all new regulations in fiscal 2017 net out at zero. Read the President’s lips: No added cost!

This is music to investor ears. Within a couple of weeks of EO 13771, the S&P 500 Index rose 5 percent. The chief executive’s order is not the only reason for the jump, but clearly less federal regulation means more profit for your company. Right?

Maybe not. Like President Trump himself, EO 13771 is only concerned with “how many” and “how much.” Also like the President himself, the order tars all regulation with the same brush. You’d never know it from EO 13771, but companies in all sectors—agriculture, auto, financial services, healthcare, pharma, tech, telecommunications, etc.—depend on and demand regulation. Read the rest here...

Tuesday, February 7, 2017

Exaggerated Truth-Telling Is Commonplace, But Not Admirable

LinkedIn Pulse, Feb. 7, 2017

by Theodore Kinni


In 1919, as the White and Red armies fought a brutal, seesaw war for control of Russia, British War Secretary Winston Churchill prodded his government to commit troops to the fight. The Bolsheviks, he declared, were “swarms of typhus bearing vermin.” They “hop and caper like ferocious baboons amid the ruins of their cities and the corpses of their victims.” Churchill’s rhetoric was so inflammatory that, after he addressed the House of Commons on the topic, Tory Party leader A.J. Balfour felt compelled to comment. With quintessential British coolness, the former Prime Minister told the future Prime Minister, “I admire the exaggerated way you tell the truth.”

Unfortunately, exaggerated truth-telling is as commonplace in business as in politics. Walter Isaacson cites Steve Job’s “reality-distortion field” repeatedly in his go-to biography of the Apple’s mercurial chief. “[Jobs] would assert something—be it a fact about world history or a recounting of who suggested an idea at a meeting—without considering the truth,” writes Isaacson. He would conjure up an impossible production date, for instance, and demand it be met. Surprisingly, as Isaacson recounts, it often was.

Elon Musk seems to have picked up Job’s penchant for exaggerated truth-telling. Musk says that Tesla’s factory in Fremont, CA will produce as many as 500,000 vehicles in 2018—an “extraordinary leap in production” from less than 84,000 in 2016, according to Jeff Rothfeder’s insightful analysis in The New Yorker. Can Musk’s employees and suppliers deliver on his promise or is this exaggerated truth-telling? Well, as The Wall Street Journal calculates it, Tesla has missed Musk’s projections more than 20 times in the past five years. Read the rest here.

Wednesday, July 6, 2016

Fit for Service government: The opportunity in the GCC’s fiscal challenge

Learned a lot lending an editorial hand on this white paper

PWC Strategy&, July 5, 2016


Fit for Service government

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are in a fiscal crunch. Even if the GCC member states can grow non-oil revenues by 10 percent annually over the rest of this decade and the average price per barrel of oil returns to US$50, their budgets will still need to be reduced by approximately $100 billion (7 percent of GCC GDP) on an annual basis to achieve fiscal balance.

All GCC governments have announced spending cuts, but conventional strategies, such as across-the-board or narrowly focused cuts, could do irreparable harm to their economic and social development. Instead, they need a more effective approach — one that enables them to cut costs and grow stronger simultaneously. This approach, which Strategy& developed for the private sector and customized for government, is called Fit for Service.

Fit for Service achieves substantial and sustainable reductions in spending, while bolstering investment in the government services and initiatives that are essential to the long-term security and well-being of governments’ constituents. It involves four actions: articulating strategy; transforming the existing cost structure of government services; building the necessary capabilities; and reorganizing the government’s operating model for high performance. There are two enablers of these actions. The first is digital, which drives the digital transformation of government. The second is the development of the talent needed within government and the national economy at large along with the creation of a change-friendly culture that can support and nurture stakeholders as they undertake transformational initiatives.

Fit for Service initiatives are difficult but worth the effort because the leaders of the GCC member states cannot simply cut costs by conventional means if they are to transform the cost base of their governments and create a more sustainable fiscal future. Download the full paper here.

Thursday, December 24, 2015

How to Justify a Breathtaking CEO Pay Ratio

By Theodore Kinni
strategy+business, December 22, 2015

In August 2015, the U.S. Securities and Exchange commissioners voted 3-2 in favor of a new rule that requires public companies to report their CEO’s total annual compensation as a ratio to their employees’ median pay. The SEC didn’t rush into this decision. Far from it. The vote came five years after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, which mandated the rule, and two years (and 280,000 public comments!) after the SEC announced that it would consider complying with that mandate. Moreover, the rule has plenty of loopholes. For instance, it doesn’t apply to companies with annual revenues below US$1 billion. And it doesn’t take effect until 2017.
The delay and controversy were blamed on a number of plausible causes: that it was a ploy by unions to gain negotiating leverage; that it didn’t measure anything of consequence; that it would cost too much to implement. But it’s hard not to believe that the real reason corporate lobbyists and leaders weren’t enthusiastic about a swift adoption of this rule was fear. As the Economic Policy Institute has shown, the ratio of CEO pay in major companies to the median pay of their employees is somewhere around 300:1. Formally reporting such ratios in stark terms would likely add fuel to the already roaring fire surrounding economic inequality. In 2014, according to a Pew Research Center survey, the people of Europe and the U.S. pegged economic inequality as “the greatest danger to the world.” (In 2015, inequality dropped a ranking or so because ISIS took the top spot.)
The leaders who fret about class warfare might want to add Harry G. Frankfurt’s slim book, On Inequality(Princeton University Press, 2015), to their reading lists. Frankfurt is a professor emeritus of philosophy at Princeton University. He is also the author of On Bullshit (Princeton University Press, 2005), which topped the New York Times bestseller list a decade ago and opened with this provocative line: “One of the most salient features of our culture is that there is so much bullshit.” His definition of this barnyard epithet: a widespread tendency for people to use words and language to obfuscate.

In his new book, which contains adapted versions of two previously published papers, Frankfurt argues that much of the discourse around economic inequality fits the bullshit bill. He finds nothing morally objectionable about economic inequality per se. “The egalitarian condemnation of inequality as inherently bad loses much of its force, I believe, when we recognize that those who are doing considerably worse than others may nonetheless be doing rather well,” he writes.
On the other hand, Frankfurt also finds nothing inherently beneficial about economic equality. “Inequality of incomes might be decisively eliminated, after all, just by arranging that all incomes be equally below the poverty line,” he writes. “Needless to say, that way of achieving equality of incomes — by making everyone equally poor — has very little to be said for it.”
This might make On Inequality sound like a straw man argument for astronomical CEO salaries. But Frankfurt does not let companies off the hook. Rather than strive to eliminate inequality, he says we should focus on eradicating poverty. He proposes a “doctrine of sufficiency,” which asserts that we have a moral obligation to see that everyone has “enough” money. Frankfurt defines “enough” as a standard that allows people to live a happy life or, at least, one in which their unhappiness cannot be alleviated by more money.
Indeed, what does it matter if some employees have more than others, as long as all employees have what they need? Isn’t this the reasoning behind ideas like the $15 minimum wage? Fast-food workers across the U.S. aren’t going on strike for hikes to CEO-level pay. They simply want to earn enough from their work to live above the poverty line.
On Inequality contains plenty of fuel for flameouts on both sides of the economic inequality debate. And I suspect that Frankfurt would welcome them. (Certainly, they could help him sell lots of books.) But I came away from this volume thinking that any CEO who could run a profitable business that also provided a reasonable living for each of its employees would richly deserve a breathtaking pay ratio.

Saturday, May 2, 2015

Why King Charles lost his head

Saumitra Jha: How Financial Innovation Helped Start the English Civil War (and Why That’s Important Today)

 
A Stanford scholar explains why financial mechanisms could be useful to align diverse interests.

Monday, November 3, 2014

Killer quotes #11



 

 

 

"Long live freedom and damn the ideologies"

 

-- Robinson Jeffers

 

 

Thursday, October 9, 2014

Mia Farrow's army

My new book post on strategy+business:

The Price of Privatizing War

My experience with mercenaries extends about as far as Abbott and Costello in the Foreign Legion, a comedy that ran repeatedly on a New York television station when my brothers and I were young and never failed to tickle our funny bones. Yeah, yeah, I know—très sophistiquè. But in those days, private military companies (PMCs) were well beyond the ken of four kids from New Jersey.

These days, on regular drives to the Outer Banks in North Carolina, I pass a turnoff that leads to a 7,000-acre training center belonging to a PMC named Academi.

According to the company’s website, it “boasts many unique training facilities, including 50 tactical ranges, five ballistic houses, multiple MOUT/scenario facilities, four ship-boarding simulators, two airfields and three drop-zones, a three-mile tactical driving track, 25 classrooms, multiple explosive training ranges, a private training center, accommodations for over 300 personnel, and other training support activity centers.” Academi acquired the center from Blackwater, the notorious PMC whose employees killed 17 civilians in Baghdad’s Nisour Square in 2007.

Both companies supply services in the “market for force,” as Sean McFate, an assistant professor at the National Defense University and adjunct social scientist at the RAND Corporation, puts it. They are part of a multibillion-dollar industry (estimates range from US$20 to $100 billion annually) that includes public multinational companies run by veteran Fortune 500 executives and represented by their own trade association.

McFate explores this industry in Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order (Oxford University Press, 2014). And happily, he does it in a way that eschews moral hysteria in favor of a dispassionate, academic approach. That may be because he has worked as a defense contractor (helping Liberia build its army, for example, among other assignments), and studied the industry. No matter what you think about “for-profit killing and the commodification of conflict,” McFate makes a strong case that demand for PMCs will expand in the decades and, perhaps, centuries ahead. The privatization of war is a growth business.

McFate acknowledges that PMCs are an emotionally charged subject. But he also puts them in historical perspective. They’re not a new concept. Xenophon’s Ten Thousand—whose story Peter Drucker said taught him everything he needed to know about leadership—were Greek mercenaries. Mercenary companies (condottieri) were the go-to guys if you wanted to wage war in the late Middle Ages. “By the middle of the seventeenth century,” explains McFate, “the conduct of violence was a capitalist enterprise no different than any other industry.” Around that time, states began to monopolize the market for force by building standing armies, and private armies were outlawed. What better way to guarantee the security of your kingdom than to have the only army in town?

Mercenaries didn’t disappear entirely after that, but the demand for their services was relatively limited, until the United States started hiring PMCs to bolster its downsized standing army in Iraq and Afghanistan around 2003. And it’s unlikely that demand will fall again, even as the U.S. buying binge subsides. The reason, explains McFate, is that we are entering a period of neomedievalism, in which “the world’s order is polycentric, with authority diluted and shared among state and non-state actors alike.”

This means that the market for force is diversifying, with the demand stemming from more and more countries, transnational organizations like the United Nations, NGOs, corporations, and even movie actors. Yep, as McFate reminds us, Mia Farrow approached Blackwater and several human rights organizations in 2008 with a plan to end the genocide in Dafur. She wanted to pay Blackwater to stage an armed intervention aimed at creating protected refugees camps, while the human rights organizations mounted a media campaign to force a U.N. peacekeeping mission. The well-intentioned idea fell through, but could Farrow really hire a private army and invade Sudan? Yes, and successfully “for days and perhaps even weeks,” concluded McFate, who was called on to evaluate the feasibility of the plan shortly after it was conceived.

The Modern Mercenary is filled with fascinating stuff, and its bottom line is that there is no stopping the continuing development of the market for force. So, what—if anything—should be done? McFate says we have to regulate the industry while the free market for its services is still dominated by the demand from a few big customers, mainly the U.S. If we don’t, he warns, the profit motive could cause PMCs to perpetuate armed conflict. And then, we might really get a look at what the world was like in the Middle Ages.

Friday, June 20, 2014

Will Chinese demand create global shortages in natural resources?

My no-always-weekly blog post on s+b is up:

Understanding China’s Resource Quest


Much has been written about China’s supersized demand for natural resources—oil and gas, metallic ores, and agricultural commodities—and the effects it could have on the global economy, politics, and the environment. Often these prognostications are suspect: It’s only natural to wonder whether self-interest is skewing a metal trader’s prediction that Chinese demand will drive copper’s price to stratospheric levels or a lobbyist’s prediction that a Chinese company’s acquisition of a U.S. oil company threatens national security.

That’s why I was quite interested in By All Means Necessary: How China’s Resource Quest is Changing the World (Oxford University Press, 2014), a new book written by Elizabeth C. Economy and Michael Levi, senior fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Economy is an expert on China and author of the seminal book on that nation’s environmental challenges. Levi is an expert in global politics and energy economics. They make for an authoritative team.

The faintly ominous ring of their book’s title notwithstanding, Economy and Levi are dispassionate and evenhanded. Contrary to many experts, they find that, by and large, China is not trying to secure the resources it needs by buying up ore deposits and oil fields—actions that could lead to a stranglehold on vital material. Instead, it is procuring natural resources mainly through trade. This has contributed to radical price increases and more competitive markets. But, according to the authors, further natural resource price shocks are unlikely because the markets have adjusted to Chinese demand.

In response to political fearmongering, Economy and Levi conclude that “the impact of China’s resource quest on international politics and security has been modest thus far.” They admit that China’s willingness to trade with nations like Iran has “helped blunt the impact of Western sanctions.” But they do not find that China has contributed to wars, like the one waged in the Sudan, where China’s state-owned oil company CNPC plays an instrumental role in extracting and refining oil and where 50 percent of the oil produced annually is exported to China.

The authors are less sanguine about the environmental effects of China’s resource needs, mainly because the same challenges that the nation faces domestically are present when it tries to obtain natural resources overseas. When Chinese companies seek to extract resources in nations with lax environmental regulation, a sort of double whammy can occur because neither party is policing the situation. There is a silver lining though: As Chinese companies interact with other more environmentally responsible multinationals, they are actually improving their practices—either because they’re feeling international pressure to do so, or because they’ve found that being responsible can also be profitable. And with corporate responsibility on the state agenda in China, the authors also expect to see better practices in the overseas ventures of Chinese firms.

The authors of By All Means Necessary also analyze the winners and losers among the main players affected by China’s quest for resources. Resource consumers who must buy in the marketplace will pay more, but the owners of those resources will profit from higher demand. Overseas investors have a major new competitor with which to contend and will need to avoid a “race to the bottom.” Governments, especially the U.S. government, will need to factor China’s resource needs into their actions to maintain their own stockpiles and to avoid igniting resource wars. National security is a two-way street.

None of these conclusions sound particularly dire, especially when you consider that China is simply assuming its place among the rest of world’s most resource-hungry nations. And if you dip back into history and examine the behavior of other nations in their quest for natural resources, such as Belgium in the Congo in the late 1800s and the U.S. and the U.K. in Iran in the 1950s, China looks like a shining exemplar…so far.

Wednesday, May 21, 2014

Gregory Clark on how we get ahead

My weekly book post on s+b:

Does Capitalism Create Social Mobility?

 The storyline of capitalism—and the technological innovation that simultaneously supports and drives it forward—is almost always one of ever-greater personal freedom and opportunity. Slaves and serfs, whose families had been chained to the plows of noble-born landowners generation after generation, are transformed into wage earners who sell their services in demand-driven labor markets. Wage owners pull themselves up by their bootstraps and educate their children, who then enter the professional ranks. With the liberal application of hard work, inventiveness, or entrepreneurial chutzpah, anyone can rise through the ranks of society. The sky is the limit. Or is it?

This is the question that Gregory Clark, economics professor at the University of California, Davis, seeks to answer in his new book, The Son Also Rises: Surnames and the History of Social Mobility (Princeton University Press, 2014). Clark has a predilection for investigating interesting questions, as well as for literary puns. His last book, A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World (Princeton University Press, 2007), sought to explain why the Industrial Revolution sparked and caught fire in England, and not in other parts of the world. His Darwinian answer was that England was peopled by descendants of the upper classes, who over hundreds of years had survived at higher rates than people in the lower classes. As a result, English upper class values, such as hard work, rationality, and education, which were conducive to an industrialized society, also survived.

Clark figured this out by collecting and analyzing data on the English economy from 1200 to 1870. In The Son Also Rises, he uses a similarly data-driven approach. This time, he uses uncommon surnames, such as Pepys, “to track the rich and poor through many generations in various societies—England, the United States, Sweden, India, Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, and Chile.” Specifically, he matches up the wealth of parents and that of their offspring. The more correlation, the less social mobility.

Just as Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century (Belknap Press, 2014), calls into question the role of capitalism in wealth creation, Clark calls into question the role of capitalism in social mobility. But both conservatives and liberals will find justification for their views in the facts uncovered in The Son Also Rises. Clark, who rightfully opens his preface with the words, “This book will be controversial,” found to his surprise that intergenerational social mobility cannot be taken for granted. Industrialization did not move wealth to the wider population, at least not as freely as the prevailing free enterprise storyline would suggest. (Clark basically says that “a hundred years of research by psychologists, sociologists, and economists” into social mobility has all been incorrect.)

Instead, Clark’s research reveals that the global level of social mobility is basically unchanged over the past 800 years. In England, for instance, he finds that the level of social mobility was the same after the Industrial Revolution as it was before it. “The rich beget the rich, the poor beget the poor,” Clark concludes. “Social status is inherited as strongly as any biological trait, such as height.”

But Clark does not say that mobility doesn’t exist, or that social positions never change. Indeed, his research reveals that upward and downward mobility are both continuously at play in human society. One critical factor is the intermarriage between rich and poor, which over time creates a constant regression to the mean. “In the end, the descendants of today’s rich and poor will achieve complete equality in their expected social position,” explains Clark. “This equality may require three hundred years to come about,” but it will inevitably come, unless a family takes dramatic steps (for example, through its choice of marriage partners) to maintain its position in society.

For me, the salient point is that social mobility is being driven by “innate inherited abilities,” not by the ascendancy of capitalism or democracy or any other economic or political ideology. People born rich may go on to be successful, but wealth is not the most important thing they inherit. Far more important are nature and nurture: the genetic abilities they get from their parents (which they will only pass on if they marry people as capable as themselves), and the confidence, education, and connections their families provide.

This is a difficult message for the unlucky people born to less capable parents; they have high barriers to social mobility, as they have throughout history. Capitalism may make it easier for some individuals to realize their potential, but it does not create that potential in the first place. That’s an insight worth remembering when you hear claims to the contrary.

Wednesday, March 26, 2014

The d'oh of healthcare reform

In which I publicly complain about healthcare reform on s+b's blog for the first and last time:

The Long Road to U.S. Healthcare Reform

The HealthCare.gov team keeps sending me emails. The March 31 application deadline for coverage in 2014 is fast approaching and they’re concerned: “Millions of Americans are already benefiting from the quality, affordable health coverage available to them through the Marketplace. We want to make sure you join them.”

I appreciate that. Really. I can’t remember a time in the past 20 years when our health insurer has expressed any interest in whether my wife and I had quality, affordable coverage. Instead, it sent us annual rate increases—usually 15 to 20 percent—accompanied by a generally incomprehensible policy. Every three to four years, as the cost of our policy made the draconian risks of self-insuring start to look good, my wife renegotiated it—that is, she reduced our coverage until it reached a level that we could afford.

Of course, I was gung ho about healthcare reform. For years, I happily anticipated the competitively priced insurance that would be available on the government-run exchanges. In good humor, I waited out the silly death-panel debates and the heroic debugging of HealthCare.gov. And then, finally, I gleefully registered and followed the simple instructions to get my quote. The payoff? Higher deductibles and less comprehensive coverage at a cost approximately US$100 per month more than our existing policy. D’oh!

This is a long-winded explanation for why I wasn’t particularly thrilled to receive an advance copy of the long-titled Reinventing American Health Care: How the Affordable Care Act Will Improve Our Terribly Complex, Blatantly Unjust, Outrageously Expensive, Grossly Inefficient, Error Prone System (Public Affairs, 2014), by Ezekiel J. Emmanuel. The author was a beacon of sanity throughout the battle over reform. He is the chair of the Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy at the University of Pennsylvania and served as a special advisor for health policy to the director of the White House Office of Management and Budget for a couple years.

In his new book, Emanuel does what he does best—clearly and logically explains the U.S. healthcare system. In doing so, he reprises many of the promises that he and other reform advocates have made before in the guise of six “megatrends.”
  • The Affordable Care Act (ACA) will force a radical restructuring of the insurance industry as providers and payors integrate, and markets become more competitive.
  • The chronically and mentally ill will get better care.
  • The demand for highly expensive acute care will fall.
  • Employer-sponsored health insurance will disappear.
  • Healthcare cost inflation will subside.
  • Changes in medical education will eliminate the shortage of health professionals.
Theoretically, this prescription is just what the doctor ordered. The only problem is that Emanuel’s megatrends are predications about the future, and as he says, “Making predictions is highly risky.” The reality, which Reinventing American Health Care does not shirk, is that the ACA will not deliver the above benefits until sometime between 2020 and 2025 —and there are many ways in which it can go off the rails between now and then.
 
So, it turns out that quality, affordable healthcare is still quite a ways away for me and my wife. In the meantime, our insurer says that our policy is going to get cancelled next year because it supposedly doesn’t conform to the standards mandated by the ACA, and our choices on HealthCare.gov are significantly more expensive than the $1200 per month we’re paying now. Good thing we dodged the socialized medicine bullet.

Wednesday, February 26, 2014

Is investigative journalism dying out?

My weekly book post on s+b's blog covers two books--one that bemoans the dearth of muckrakers and one by a muckraker


Muckraking Is Alive and Well

Investigative reporting is the pinnacle of journalism, and has been ever since the early 20th century when writers like Ida Tarbell, Lincoln Steffens, and Ray Stannard Baker exposed systemic corruption in the United States and changed the nation. They helped bring down business trusts, provided the impetus for much-needed regulation and oversight (in Steffen’s case, the establishment of the Federal Reserve System), and created political platforms for reformers, such as Teddy Roosevelt, who named them muckrakers. Is there a business reporter who doesn’t aspire to follow in their footsteps?
 
And yet, less and less investigative—or accountability—reporting is being published, according to Columbia Journalism Review (CJR) editor and fellow Dean Starkman. In his fascinating, if somewhat flawed book, The Watchdog That Didn’t Bark: The Financial Crisis and the Disappearance of Investigative Journalism (Columbia University Press, 2014), Starkman points to the subprime lending meltdown of 2007 as a primary example of his contention.

Although there has been no lack of high-profile investigative reporting since subprime lending imploded and caused a global recession, an examination of reporting on the subject in the years before the crisis tells another, rather curious, story. According to research that Starkman conducted at CSJ between 2004 and 2006—the period in which the worst lending excesses occurred—“mainstream accountability reporting [was] virtually dormant. The watchdog, powerful as it was, didn’t bark when it was most needed.”

But there’s more to the story... read it here

Monday, February 24, 2014

Zachary Shore on getting a sense of the enemy

My Q&A with professor Zach Shore for strategy+business was published today:

Zachary Shore on How to Predict the Future
A historian’s approach to strategic empathy can help you anticipate your rivals’ next moves.

If Komatsu decides to cut prices in a bid to grow its market share, will Caterpillar match the cuts? If Amazon makes a full-out run at the grocery business, will Kroger compete online? If Google refuses to censor Internet searches, will China’s government deny its citizens access to the search engine? Predicting the actions and reactions of competitors—and other stakeholders—is often an essential element in executive decision making, and getting those predictions wrong can have costly consequences.

Historian Zachary Shore believes leaders in all spheres can reduce decision risks and improve the accuracy of their predictions by developing a skill that he calls strategic empathy. In his fourth and latest book, A Sense of the Enemy: The High Stakes History of Reading Your Rival’s Mind (Oxford University Press, 2014), the professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, a research university operated by the U.S. Navy in Monterey, Calif., offers a new perspective on predicting the behavior of others. Shore discussed his findings and their applications with strategy+business.

S+B: What is strategic empathy, and why does it matter?
SHORE: Strategic empathy is the ability to step out of our own heads and into the minds of others. It’s the ability to discern someone else’s underlying drivers and constraints—to understand what makes someone tick.

The idea behind strategic empathy has been around for a long time in the military and politics. Two thousand years ago, Sun Tzu wrote about the importance of thinking like the enemy. What we don’t have is a reliable way of doing it... read the rest here

Wednesday, October 30, 2013

Business lessons from U.S. foreign policy failures

Stephen Walt, the noted international affairs professor from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, spent a day at William & Mary last week, and I got a chance to attend a thought-provoking and highly articulate talk that he gave courtesy of the Institute for the Theory & Practice of International Relations. Walt says that U.S. foreign policy has been pretty abysmal for the past 20 years. He enumerated the external and internal reasons for this, and as he discussed them, it occurred to me that each of these reasons represented a flaw or pitfall that large, powerful companies--like large, powerful countries--would do well to consider and avoid. The talk was about 40 minutes long (sans questions) and well worth the investment in time.


Wednesday, August 14, 2013

Robert Monks takes on the corporate drones

My weekly post on the s+b blog is about a new book from a guy I've long admired, Robert A.G. Monks:


In “Drone Corporations,” Self-Interest Prevails
In Citizens DisUnited: Passive Investors, Drone CEOs, and the Corporate Capture of the American Dream (Miniver Press, 2013), Robert A.G. Monks sets the tone right off the bat by recalling the time he stood up at an ExxonMobil annual meeting and addressed CEO Lee Raymond as “emperor.” Indeed, Monks has long been a highly vocal gadfly and leading activist when it comes to corporate governance. 
Here, he argues that corporate governance is more important than ever because of two relatively recent developments. First, corporations have ascended to levels of unprecedented power in the United States, thanks in large part to legal rulings. The Supreme Court’s decision in the 2010 case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, for example, removed virtually all limitations on corporate political spending—a “grotesque decision,” rightly judges Monks. Second, the leaders of the largest and most powerful corporations in the U.S. (ExxonMobil, IBM, and General Electric top the list) have never been less accountable to shareholders. This is because of weak boards and the movement of large ownership positions to passive institutional investors, among other things. The result is “drone corporations,” in which “manager kings” have free rein to pursue their own self-interest. Monks puts more than half of the Fortune 500 among their numbers...read the rest here


Wednesday, July 24, 2013

China's real industrial advantage

My post on the s+b blog this week is about a book that seeks to illuminate one of the less understood sources of China's industrial might:

Government Subsidies Pave the Way in China
In the 2000s, China transformed itself from a net importer to one of the largest producers and exporters in the world in four mature, capital-intensive industries: steel, glass, paper, and auto parts. What accounted for this success, which in each case was achieved in a short five-year span? 
Industry research reveals that each of the four has relatively low labor requirements, so it wasn't China’s seemingly endless supply of inexpensive workers. The Chinese companies didn't enjoy economies of scale or scope. Nor did the undervaluation of the renminbi explain their growth.
According to Usha Haley, director of West Virginia University’s Robbins Center for Global Business and Strategy, and George Haley, a professor of marketing and international business at the University of New Haven, it was government subsidies that drove this industrial transformation. In Subsidies to Chinese Industry: State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and Trade Policy (Oxford University Press, 2013), they calculate that subsidies from China’s governmental bodies—in the form of free or low-cost loans, energy, materials, land, and technology—provided the dollar equivalent of as much as 30 percent of the output of these four industries...read the rest here.

Saturday, September 26, 2009

Derailing healthcare reform

It seems crystal clear that a country that ranks first in healthcare costs and 37th in overall health system performance urgently needs healthcare reform. But based on the spam I've been getting, it's also pretty clear that the so-called debate over reform is setting new lows for public discourse. Death panels? Gimme a break!

The campaign against healthcare reform reminds me of this quote from Richard White's biography of Huey Long, Kingfish: The Reign of Huey P. Long(Random House, 2006):

In order to succeed, a mass movement must be superficial for quick appeal, fundamental for permanence, dogmatic for certainty, and practical for workability.
That seems to define the movement to derail reform in a nutshell and I can't help but believe that it is being orchestrated and financed by commercial interests. Follow the money, right?

By the way, Long's biographer found the quote in a 1935 Saturday Evening Post article published shortly after Long's assassination. It was spoken by a guy named Gerald L.K. Smith, a preacher who had a hankering for political power. He helped Long organize the Share Our Wealth Society, a scheme to take from the rich and give to the poor that Long cooked up during the Great Depression, which Smith tried to take over after Long was killed. Smith was a pro-Nazi white supremacist and a virulent anti-Semite who opposed labor unions. Unfortunately, like insurance companies and healthcare providers, he also knew how to get other people to do his bidding.

Saturday, June 20, 2009

Welcome to the next depression

Richard Posner isn't afraid to use the "D" word. He says we're in a depression -- as defined by a steep decline in output, a widespread sense of crisis, costly remediation efforts, and long-term impacts.

In A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of '08 and the Descent into Depression (Harvard University Press), Posner persuasively argues that this meltdown wasn't caused by rotten financiers or grasping investors. Instead, the depression was caused by a systemic flaw -- everybody acted rationally and that caused an economic bubble that, like bubbles do, popped.

I won't go into the details; you really should read the book - even if it gets a little long as the same basic argument gets recycled through each element of Posner's thesis. But there is one section worth calling out for corporate consideration: it deals with why companies tend to get caught out when bubbles pop and this portion of it adds some fuel to the debate over executive compensation.

Riding a bubble can be rational even though you know it’s a bubble. For you can’t know when it will burst, and until it does it is expanding and that means that values are rising rapidly, so that if you climb off the bubble you will have foregone a large profit opportunity. As Citigroup’s then CEO put it in July 2007, “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.” (He didn’t know it, but the music had stopped.)

The tendency of corporate management to cling to a bubble and hope for the best – or, equivalently, the tendency to maximize short-run profits – is strengthened if, as on Wall Street during the boom, executive compensation is both very generous and truncated on the downside. For then every day that you stay in you make a lot of money, and you know that when the bubble bursts you’ll be okay because you negotiated a generous severance package with your board of directors. Limited liability is a factor, too; neither an executive heavily invested in his company’s stock nor any other shareholder will be personally liable for the company’s losses should it go broke.

And how do executives get such a sweet deal? Well, the board will have hired a compensation consultant who will have advised generosity in fixing the compensation of senior management and as part of that largess will have recommended that senior executives receive a fat severance package (a “golden parachute”) if they are terminated. The consultant will have told the board this because if the board is generous to senior management, senior management may out of gratitude hire the consultant to do other consulting for the firm. And the board will have listened to the consultant’s recommendation because the board will have been predisposed to be generous with senior executives’ salaries. Most members of a corporation’s board of directors will be senior executives themselves. And because a firm’s chief executive officer has a say in whether board members are reelected to the board, the higher a board member thinks CEO compensation should be, the more boards he will be invited to join.

The more generous an executive’s compensation and the more insulated his compensation package is from any adversity that may befall his company, the greater will be his incentive to maximize profits in the short run – especially in a bubble, where the short run is highly profitable but the long run a looming disaster.

Saturday, June 6, 2009

One question: Les Leopold

Les Leopold's readable new book, The Looting of America: How Wall Street's Game of Fantasy Finance Destroyed Our Jobs, Pensions, and Prosperity—and What We Can Do About It is out this month from Chelsea Green. Les directs two nonprofits, The Labor Institute and The Public Health Institute, which are aimed at educating union workers on public policy issues.

The crux of Les' thesis, if I can summarize without subverting, is that the roots of this recession lie in the gap between productivity and real wages, which began growing in the early 1970s. Instead of going to workers in the form of wages, who would have spent the money on real goods and services that grow economies, productivity gains began going to owners and executives, who, having all the stuff they needed, invested the money. All this new money seeking good returns led to risky lending practices and financial instruments, which, in turn, led to the current mess.

This is a provocative and debatable argument, and certainly one that will resonate in pro-labor circles. My question for Les: In pegging the financial meltdown in the U.S. to the decoupling of productivity gains and real wages, the underlying inference is that those gains – or a larger portion of them – were wrongly diverted away from wage earners. What caused this divergence and why are wage earners entitled to a larger portion of productivity gains?

Here's his reply:
There really is no consensus on why productivity and wages diverged so dramatically. I can only give you my read. I think several trends entwined to undercut the price of labor.

First was what we call “globalization” which, in this case, refers to the ability of corporations to move capital quickly to all parts of the globe. The Bretton Woods agreements, which ended in the early 1970s, had previously prevented such rapid movement of investment capital. But after its collapse, corporations could set up shop in low-wage areas and import the final products back into the United States. American labor, in effect, was in direct competition with workers all over the globe.

This led to the second factor: the decline of unions. The globalization process and its impact on U.S. workers could have been mitigated, in my opinion, had the labor movement been stronger. But labor union density had been in a secular decline since the mid-1950s. Why that happened is a much longer story, but the impact was two fold: First, unions could not moderate national policies on deregulation, capital flight and cheap imports; and second, unions could not effectively bargain hard at the workplace.

The third set of factors involved a shift in political power to the upper income brackets. During the Reagan era and beyond, social programs were slashed, taxes on the wealthy were reduced, the minimum wage was not increased to keep up with the cost of living, and labor laws were weakened.

I don't think we can blame new technologies for the transfer of productivity gains. The computer revolution came later as did the Internet. Manufacturing was becoming more and more automated throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, there was much hand-wringing in the late 1950s about the impact of automation on work and the rise of leisure --- what would workers do with all their free time?

That's why my main point is the following: The distribution of the fruits of productivity is more like a tug of war – a genuine struggle between the investor class and the rest of us. It’s not automatic. Policy impacts the division of the pie.

There is, however, an additional and very important factor to consider, no matter whether you favor more money for working people or more for the investment classes. I think we are living through a real life experiment about what happens when you let too much money accumulate at the top: It runs out of tangible investment opportunities in the real economy and much of it ends up in Wall Street’s fantasy finance casino.

There is a relationship between the rising gap between the super rich and the rest of us, and the crashing of the economy. Such were the conditions before the Great Depression and those conditions almost led us there again. I believe that for the sake of the entire economy, it is best to narrow the income/wealth gap.